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Abstract  
In 2004, the Office of the Victorian Attorney General released the Justice Statement Part I, which 
outlined a ten-year plan to modernise Victoria’s criminal justice system. A key initiative emerging from 
this idealistic reform agenda involved a sentence indication scheme for indictable offences, on the basis 
that it would increase clearance rates; thus in theory, benefiting all parties. In line with the 
recommendations of a report compiled by the Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council (VSAC) in 2007, a 
pilot sentence indication trial commenced in the County and Supreme Courts, with the sunset clause 
that it be evaluated after two years and either fully integrated into legislation or abolished (Criminal 
Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 208–9, s 384). In February 2010, the VSAC released its evaluative report 
recommending the scheme be maintained in its current form. This paper critically analyses some 
potential flaws in the arguments of the VSAC report, with a particular focus on the ineffectiveness of the 
scheme, and its potential to result in unjust outcomes. 
Introduction 
In 2004, the Victorian Office of the Attorney General (2004:24) released its ten-year law reform plan, 
which focused on addressing issues of equality, accessibility, efficiency and effectiveness. In response, 
there have been a breadth of changes in Victoria, including the enactment of the Victims’ Charter Act 
2006 (Vic) and the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), and reforms to various 
statutes (Crimes Act 1958 (Vic); Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic); Evidence Act 2009 (Vic)). A key initiative 
emerging in the former government’s idealistic agenda involved a sentence indication scheme for 
indictable offences, on the premise that encouraging early guilty pleas can benefit all parties through 
increased clearance rates and reduced backlogs in the courts. Thus in line with the recommendations of 
a Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council (VSAC) report (2007), a pilot trial was implemented into 
Victoria’s County and Supreme Courts, governed by the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 208–9.2  
Indictable sentence indication schemes are not exclusive to Victoria. They operate by case law 
authority in the United Kingdom (R v Goodyear) and informally in New Zealand (New Zealand Law 
Reform Commission 2005). New South Wales (NSW) also employed a scheme for three years in the 
mid 1990s, although this was ultimately abandoned because inappropriate sentences were being 
indicated, and it failed to achieve its anticipated efficiency gains (Criminal Procedure (Sentence 
Indication) Amendment Act 1992 (NSW); Spears et al 1994; Weatherburn et al 1995; Weatherburn and 
Lind 1995). It was this failure of the NSW process, as well as concerns specific to the proposed 
Victorian scheme identified in parliamentary debates, which resulted in a sunset clause being 
included in the legislation to require the VSAC to review the scheme by July 2010, and a decision be 
made on its future (Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 384; Victorian Parliament 2007:4355).  
                                                 
1  Dr Asher Flynn, Lecturer in Legal Studies, School of Social Sciences, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria 
   
2  Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), the scheme was governed by s 23A of the Crimes (Criminal Trials) 
Act 1999 (Vic). A pilot sentence indication trial for summary offences was also implemented in the Magistrates’ Court in July 2008, 
governed by ss 60–1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic). For a brief discussion of this scheme, see Flynn (2009, 2010).  
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This paper explores some potential flaws in the VSAC review, which recommended the scheme 
be maintained in its current form. In particular, it explores some of the issues pertaining to justice and 
just outcomes which are raised by the possible pressures that indications place upon accused persons 
to plead guilty, the potential inaccuracy of the indications, and the minimal impact the scheme has 
had on clearance rates. While sentence indications may not seem immediately provocative—and nor 
do they draw the endless attention of populist media outlets—this paper intends to stimulate 
discussion regarding the continued use of this scheme, and highlight it as an area worthy of critical 
consideration.  
The Review 
Victoria’s sentence indication scheme allows an accused person, or their representative, to request an 
indication from the judge of whether they are likely to receive a custodial or non-custodial sentence if a 
guilty plea were entered (Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 208). If a non-custodial indication is given, 
and the accused person pleads guilty at the next available opportunity (either immediately after the 
indication or at the next pre-trial hearing), this is then binding on the judge in later sentencing; therefore, 
a custodial penalty cannot be imposed. However, if an accused person pleads guilty to a custodial 
indication, this can be changed to a non-custodial penalty after the revelation of all material at the later 
plea hearing (Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 209(1)(a)–209(1)(b)). If an indication is given, but the 
accused does not plead guilty, the case must be relisted before another judge, unless all parties agree 
otherwise (Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 209(2)). The right to appeal against the sentence is not 
affected by the scheme, and no restrictions exist on the type of crimes eligible; however, the decision to 
grant an indication is subject to non-reviewable judicial discretion (Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 
208(4), 209(6)). 
The VSAC evaluated the operation of the scheme from 1 July 2008 until 30 June 2009. Data on 
the number and outcome of indications was obtained from the Office of Public Prosecutions, as no 
court records pertaining to the scheme were maintained. Interviews were conducted with relevant 
stakeholders (judicial officers, legal practitioners, witness assistance service employees), and 
consultations occurred with the major legal associations (Victoria Legal Aid, Criminal Bar 
Association, Law Institute of Victoria) (VSAC 2010).  
During the 12-month review, 27 indications were given, 25 of these in the County Court (VSAC 
2010:15). Eighteen indications were for non-custodial penalties; all were accepted (VSAC 2010:26). 
Nine indications were for custodial penalties, five of which were accepted; however, defence 
practitioners interviewed in the review noted that some custodial indications included a statement 
from the judge suggesting that after hearing the plea material, there was a possibility the penalty 
would be reduced to a non-custodial sentence (VSAC 2010:26). Thus it was arguably more a half 
custodial/half non-custodial indication to which they pleaded guilty. The most common offences for 
which an indication was sought were intentionally causing injury and intentionally causing serious 
injury, followed by drug trafficking and robbery (VSAC 2010:18).  
At various stages in the review, the VSAC (2010:10) suggested there was too little data to make 
conclusive observations or recommendations, stating: ‘in the course of its consultations, the Council 
has been made aware of a number of issues relating to the operation of the scheme that may require 
some changes. However, the very small number of cases to date precludes any firm recommendations 
being made.’ Despite observing this, the VSAC (2010:83) ultimately recommended the scheme be 
‘continued indefinitely, consistent with the legislation framework in … the Criminal Procedure Act 
2009 (Vic)’. 
Pressures on Accused Persons 
Many criticisms have been applied to the scheme since its initial proposal. These have ranged from its 
negative impact on victims, to the possibility for judge shopping or inappropriate indications to be 
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given, in a similar vein to the NSW process (Sulan 2000; Victorian Parliament 2007:4345; Weatherburn 
and Lind 1995). Significant in the context of this discussion are the criticisms that responding to court 
inefficiency was being prioritised above the interests of justice, and the scheme appeared incompatible 
with other legislation, particularly the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) 
(‘Charter’), which provided increased recognition of accused person’s rights within criminal proceedings 
(Flynn 2009; Victorian Parliament 2007:4351). This was a prominent issue recognised by the Scrutiny of 
Acts and Regulations Committee (SARC) (2007), which identified the incompatibility of sentence 
indications with s 25(2)(k) of the Charter: that people charged with a criminal offence must ‘not be 
compelled … to confess guilt’. The potential for indications to place undue pressures upon accused 
persons to plead guilty was also a concern identified in parliament (2007:4348): 
 What this legislation will do is introduce a system where people who are disadvantaged and 
not able to make the judgements which are so fundamental to their future will be under 
enormous pressure to plead guilty, simply because they think that course of action is better 
than going to trial. 
The potential for the scheme to pressure accused persons into pleading guilty is further 
strengthened by the requirement that the judge make a statement when giving an indication that a 
more severe sentence is likely if the case proceeds; thus accused persons may interpret the indication 
such that they should plead guilty immediately, or face a more severe sentence by contesting the case. 
As the SARC (2008) noted, ‘this procedure may place such defendants under heightened pressure to 
plead guilty, especially if the sentence indicated is a generous one’. The requirement for judges to 
make this statement was justified in the VSAC’s 2007 report, on the basis that the ‘revelation from the 
judiciary that a more severe sentence would be indicated if a guilty plea was not entered at this point 
in the process … [will] increase the transparency of the sentence indication’ (VSAC 2007:89). This 
clarification, however, is likely to have a substantially negative influence on an accused person’s 
pleading decision; as Willis (1985:141) notes, ‘even for an innocent defendant, the guilty plea with an 
expectation of leniency can be an attractive soft option’.  
While the mere possibility of a harsher sentence if the indication is rejected may pressure an 
accused person into pleading guilty, when this fact is directly stated to an accused person by a judge, 
the potential for a coerced guilty plea is increased. The negative impacts of judicial involvement in 
any process that provides pleading incentives to accused persons were recognised by Baldwin and 
McConville (1977:33) in their analysis of plea bargaining in the United Kingdom, where they claimed, 
‘if the judge involves himself [sic] … all talk of the voluntariness of the defendant’s plea is 
meaningless. So far as the defendant is concerned, the question of guilt or innocence is no longer an 
issue’. These concerns can be readily applied to the Victorian scheme, given the judge’s role in stating 
the potential consequences of not pleading guilty when providing an indication. As McConville and 
Baldwin’s (1981:67) later research demonstrates, ‘it hardly needs stressing that faced with 
inducements … the weak, naïve, or less resilient might well be tempted to forego their right to trial 
and instead plead guilty’. 
In responding to such arguments, the VSAC (2010:53) maintained that it did not find any 
evidence of pressures on accused persons to plead guilty after receiving an indication. However, this 
conclusion was based on consultations with defence practitioners only, which creates an interesting 
power dynamic, as it would be unusual for those practitioners involved in the process to say their 
client(s) felt overtly pressured to plead guilty. What the accused person might say, as highlighted by 
the pioneering work of Baldwin and McConville (1977, 1981), may differ somewhat. But even within 
the comments of defence practitioners in the review, some interesting statements regarding pressure 
were made which seemed to point to an acceptance that some pressure was applied to accused 
persons, but that the practitioners considered this to be at an ‘acceptable’ level. One participant 
claimed, ‘it is an inducement, but it is not an improper one … it is a reasonable inducement’ (VSAC 
2010:53). Another participant claimed ‘there is a lot of pressure within the system for defendants to 
plead guilty … The question is whether or not it is improper pressure’ (VSAC 2010:53).  
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There is quite a significant difference between claiming there was no evidence of any pressures 
applied to accused persons in the indication process, and the statements given by these participants. 
This difference is particularly relevant in the context of non-custodial indications, because the judge is 
effectively saying ‘if you plead guilty now you will not go to gaol, but if you do not plead guilty, you 
may face a more severe penalty’. Thus despite the claims made by the VSAC (2010) and the Victorian 
Office of the Attorney General (2010) in accepting their recommendations, it is naive to simply accept 
or assume these are ‘reasonable’ pressures and inducements, particularly when combined with any 
additional vulnerabilities that may impact on an accused person’s capacity to make decisions, such as 
mental illness or drug addiction (Baldwin and McConville 1977; Mack and Roach Anleu 2000:82). The 
legitimacy of the VSAC’s decision to continue using the scheme is thus questionable, particularly 
given the likely implications arising in terms of just outcomes, and in the context of the ‘access’ and 
‘equality’ aspects inherent to the ten-year law reform agenda (Victorian Office of the Attorney 
General 2004:24). 
Impact on Court Efficiency and Expectations of Just Outcomes 
Further to potentially encroaching upon the right not to be compelled to confess guilt, the SARC (2007) 
noted that the scheme is somewhat contradictory to s 25(2)(c) of the Charter: to have a trial heard 
without unreasonable delay. The SARC (2007:10) observed that requiring cases to be listed before a new 
judge if an indication is rejected may ‘result in significant delays in [ultimately hearing] the defendant’s 
trial’. They also noted that trials might be considerably delayed where the Crown successfully appeals 
against the sentence resulting from an indication, as the accused maintains the right to withdraw their 
guilty plea. As such, they questioned whether these provisions may ‘engage a defendant’s Charter right 
to be tried without unreasonable delay’ (SARC 2007:11), which in turn raises a number of issues 
pertaining to fairness and justice. 
A related concern is the possibility that these provisions, and the existence of the scheme itself, 
will become simply another step in an already elongated pre-trial system. There is also the potential 
for indications to become another procedure used to prolong cases (SARC 2008). Such concerns were 
validated in December 2008, when the Office of Public Prosecutions’ internal policy on challenging 
indication applications was amended to address deliberate delay tactics (Director’s Policy 4.7.1 2008 
(Vic)). This concern was further validated in the VSAC review (2010:31), which found that in 22 of the 
25 indication requests in the County Court, at least some delay was created from requiring additional 
hearings be held, or adjournments given. 
The scheme’s effectiveness in terms of its impact on clearance rates was a primary focus of the 
review. In evaluating this issue, the VSAC (2010:23) focused on the County Court (most likely because 
only two indications were given in the Supreme Court, thus there was no impact on efficiency levels 
to report), and it found that sentence indications helped resolve less than one per cent of the 2231 
cases finalised during the review period. In an attempt to bolster this figure, under the guise of 
attaining more accurate data, the VSAC argued that due to the timing of when indications can be 
sought (after four pre-trial hearings have already occurred), any guilty pleas already entered by this 
stage, and those cases resolved at trial, needed to be discounted. After removing this data, it was 
argued that sentence indications could only assist in finalising 553 County Court cases, of which the 
number resolved specifically by sentence indications leapt to a significant 4.2 per cent (VSAC 2010:23–
4). At this stage, even the VSAC (2010:31,60) acknowledged the minimal impact on clearance rates, 
stating ‘while there has been some impact in terms of increased resolution of cases, the contribution 
that this would have made on case flow has been limited’. It further stated that ‘those involved in the 
scheme, whom the Council was able to speak with … reported minimal impact on case flow and 
workload across the system’ (VSAC 2010:82). 
Despite this finding, the VSAC highlighted the 4.2 per cent resolution rate as demonstrating the 
scheme’s potential, and noted the 100 per cent acceptance rate of non-custodial indications as a basis 
for claiming that once used more regularly, particularly for non-custodial indications, the scheme 
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would impact on clearance rates. The legitimacy of this argument, however, is diminished in the 
context of Victoria’s law and order political climate, where the ability to use suspended sentences as a 
punishment for many indictable offences has been repealed by s 12 of the Sentencing Amendment Act 
2010 (Vic).3 Suspended sentences were the most common sanction imposed after an accused person 
pleaded guilty to a non-custodial indication during the review, used in 16 of the 18 cases (VSAC 
2010:35). Thus without the suspended sentence option, the number of non-custodial indications that 
can be given or accepted is likely to be significantly reduced. Accordingly, the justification for 
retaining indications based on the ‘potential’ of the scheme is limited, as it is unrealistic to expect the 
scheme would achieve significant increases in clearance rates, if there were an increase in the number 
of custodial indications given.  
Inaccuracies in Indications 
The decision to recommend the continued use of the scheme in light of Victoria’s political climate also 
seems somewhat incompatible with the increasing influence of emotionally driven/punitive tendencies 
in law and order politics. As Freiberg and Carson (2009:13) observe, legal policy, and sentencing reform 
in particular, has less to do with ‘reducing crime rates and more about a re-assertion of social values’. 
This argument is largely linked with concerns surrounding the lack of evidentiary material upon which 
indications are based and the absence of any specifications of what evidentiary material is required, 
both of which could lead to injustices, inconsistencies and inaccuracies and, in turn, a likely dissatisfied 
and emotional community (Flynn 2009:259; R v Gemmell).  
The legislation requires that the evidence prepared by the filing of the presentment be available 
to the judge, who can then use non-reviewable discretion to determine whether this is sufficient to 
provide an indication (Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 208(4)). Although some concerns 
surrounding inadequate information being available are reduced by the broad nature of indications, 
the judge’s ability to make an informed decision as to whether a custodial or binding non-custodial 
order is appropriate remains restricted. This is particularly problematic because much of the accused 
person’s personal mitigating and aggravating factors—including their circumstances at the time of 
offending, psychiatric/intellectual problems, drug addictions, future prospects and their ‘response to 
the offence and prosecution (e.g. remorse, acts of reparation)’ (Jacobson and Hough 2007:10)—may be 
unknown to the judge at the time of the indication hearing.  
In addition to the issues of justice and fairness arising from not having adequate information 
pertaining to the accused available to judges in sentencing, there are also potential consequences that 
arise in terms of sentencing outcomes. These are demonstrated by a recent study conducted in the 
United Kingdom, which found that in almost one-third of cases where the sentence was reduced from 
custodial to non-custodial, the major reason cited was personal mitigation (Jacobson and Hough 
2007:12). Judges further identified at least one factor of personal mitigation as relevant to the sentence 
imposed in almost half of the 162 cases observed (Jacobson and Hough 2007:12). Importantly, judges 
also cited personal factors as the primary reason that a non-custodial penalty could be changed to a 
custodial penalty; for example, if at the plea hearing the accused had failed to address the problems 
that led to their criminal behaviour, such as drug or gambling addictions, they were more likely to 
receive a custodial sanction than a non-custodial sanction (Jacobson and Hough 2007:12,40). This is a 
vital finding in the context of Victoria’s scheme, in light of the certainty assured by the legislation, 
which binds the court to its original non-custodial decision. Thus there is a strong basis for arguing 
that without all relevant information pertaining to the accused, Victorian judges cannot be in an 
appropriate position to accurately give a custodial or binding non-custodial indication.  
In exploring this issue, the VSAC (2010:32) focused on the scheme’s flexibility, in that, of the 
four accused persons who pleaded guilty after receiving custodial indications, three had sentences 
                                                 
3  S 12 of the Sentencing Amendment Act 2010 (Vic) introduces s 27(2B) into the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) which reads that, ‘despite 
subsection (1), a court must not make an order suspending the whole or a part of a sentence of imprisonment imposed on an offender for 
a serious offence’. This is applicable for serious offences committed after 1 January 2012. 
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reduced to non-custodial penalties.4 The VSAC (2010:33) indicated that this was a positive because it 
meant ‘the material tendered at the full plea can have an effect on the sentence ultimately imposed’. 
Therefore, any concerns pertaining to fairness or justice emerging from the absence of evidentiary 
material at the initial indication hearing can be theoretically addressed in the later plea hearing.  
Although cited as a positive, this is another example of how the indication process is 
ineffective, potentially inaccurate and unjust. If three of the four custodial indications were deemed 
inaccurate after the revelation of all relevant sentencing material, how many binding non-custodial 
indications were deemed inaccurate after the plea hearing? The flexibility assigned to custodial 
indications allows for these potential injustices to be corrected, but because there is no scope in the 
legislation for non-custodial indications to be changed upon the revelation of all material, it raises 
questions as to how many injustices were not righted in these cases. Ultimately, this ‘benefit’ 
strengthens concerns surrounding the absence of evidentiary material available to the judge, and fails 
to address the fairness, accuracy or injustice concerns surrounding the scheme in any way. The 
acceptance of these outcomes as a benefit also fails to take into consideration the importance of social 
values and emotions within the policy-making process, which Freiberg and Carson’s (2009:29) 
analysis suggests can result in a reform that is less likely to meet its objectives, including public 
approval. 
Conclusion 
The rationale behind introducing sentence indications is legitimate and important. Court backlogs and 
decreasing clearance rates are major and ongoing concerns in Victoria’s higher courts. While the 
problems of delay and inefficiency must be addressed, the scheme, in its current form, is not an 
appropriate mechanism to do so, particularly given the potential inaccuracy of indications, the possible 
injustices created for accused persons, and because there remains no data to support the claim that by 
jeopardising justice in this way, there will be a positive impact on clearance rates.  
As noted in the introduction, sentence indications are not immediately provocative; they do not 
feature in law and order campaigns; and, despite being a sentencing process, they do not receive 
significant media attention. It is thus this author’s concern that this scheme is simply slipping under 
the radar, like so many procedural reforms that are quietly implemented. But it is important that the 
flaws and potential injustices inherent to this scheme are recognised and, in a climate of legal change, 
the scheme should not be permitted to be lost within an idealistic reform agenda. 
References 
Baldwin J and McConville M (1977) Negotiated Justice: Pressures to Plead Guilty, Martin Robertson, 
London 
Flynn A (2009) ‘Sentence Indications for Indictable Offences: Increasing Court Efficiency at the Expense 
of Justice? A Response to the Victorian Legislation’, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 
vol 42 no 2, 244–68 
Flynn A (2010) ‘An Indication of Injustice: An Analysis of the Problems Inherent to Maintaining the 
Sentence Indication Scheme in Victoria’s Higher Courts’, Flinders Law Journal, vol 12 no 2, 41-78 
Freiberg A and Carson W G (2009) ‘Evidence, Emotion and Criminal Justice: The Limits to Evidence 
Based Policy’, BOCSAR 40th Anniversary Symposium, Sydney, 18–19 February, accessed online at 
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/vwFiles/02_day1_coles_s1_arie_freib
erg.pdf/$file/02_day1_coles_s1_arie_freiberg.pdf>  
                                                 
4  Five accused persons pleaded guilty to custodial indications during the review, however one of these sentences had yet to be determined 
by the conclusion of the review period (VSAC 2010:35). 
 
ANZCCC: The Australian and New Zealand Critical Criminology Conference 2010 
(c) 2011 Institute of Criminology, Sydney Law School, The University of Sydney 
http://sydney.edu.au/law/criminology 
 
The Institute of Criminology would like to thank the  
University of Western Sydney as co-sponsors of the ANZCCC. 7 
Jacobson J and Hough M (2007) Mitigation: The Role of Personal Factors in Sentencing, Prison Trust Reform, 
London 
Jacobson J and Hough M (2008) ‘Personal Mitigation’, The Barrister, vol 35, 10–11 
Mack K and Roach Anleu S (2000) ‘Choice, Consent and Autonomy in a Guilty Plea System’, Law in 
Context, vol 17 no 1, 75–92 
McConville M and Baldwin J (1981) Courts, Prosecution and Conviction, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
New Zealand Law Reform Commission (2005) Criminal Pre-Trial Processes: Justice through Efficiency 
(Report #89), New Zealand Law Reform Commission, Wellington 
Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee (SARC) (2007) Alert Digest No 16 of 2007, Victoria 
Parliament, Melbourne 
Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee (SARC) (2008) Alert Digest No 1 of 2008, Victoria 
Parliament, Melbourne 
Spears D, Poletti P and MacKinnell I (1994) Sentencing Indication Hearings Pilot Scheme, Judicial 
Commission of New South Wales, Sydney 
Sulan J R (2000) ‘Defence Co-operation in the Trial Process’, Australian Institute of Judicial Administration: 
Criminal Trial Reform Conference, Melbourne, 24–25 March, accessed online at 
<http://www.aija.org.au/ctr/SULAN.pdf>  
Victorian Office of the Attorney General (2004) New Directions for the Victorian Justice System 2004–2014, 
Department of Justice, Victoria, 27 May 2004 
Victorian Office of the Attorney General (2010) ‘Sentence Indication Scheme Eases Victims’ Burden’, 
press release, accessed online at <http://www.premier.vic.gov.au/component/content/article/93 
17.html>  
Victorian Parliament (2007) Parliamentary Debates: Legislative Assembly, 6 December, 4341–56, accessed 
online at <http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/hansard/daily-hansard/823> 
Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council (VSAC) (2007) Sentence Indications and Specified Sentence 
Discounts Final Report, Sentencing Advisory Council Publications, Melbourne 
Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council (VSAC) (2010) Sentence Indications: A Report on the Pilot Scheme, 
Sentencing Advisory Council Publications, Melbourne 
Weatherburn D and Lind B (1995) ‘The Impact of the New South Wales Sentence Indication Scheme on 
Plea Rates and Case Delay’, University of New South Wales Law Journal, vol 18 no 2, 211–31 
Weatherburn D, Matka E and Lind B (1995) Sentence Indication Scheme Evaluation: Final Report, New 
South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Sydney 
Willis J (1985) ‘Sentencing Discount for Guilty Pleas’, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 
vol 18 no 3, 131–46 
Legislation 
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) 
Crimes (Criminal Trials) Act 1999 (Vic) 
Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) 
Criminal Procedure (Sentence Indication) Amendment Act 1992 (NSW) 
 
ANZCCC: The Australian and New Zealand Critical Criminology Conference 2010 
(c) 2011 Institute of Criminology, Sydney Law School, The University of Sydney 
http://sydney.edu.au/law/criminology 
 
The Institute of Criminology would like to thank the  
University of Western Sydney as co-sponsors of the ANZCCC. 8 
Director’s Policy 4.7.1 2008 (Vic) 
Evidence Act 2009 (Vic) 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) 
Sentencing Amendment Act 2010 (Vic) 
Victims’ Charter Act 2006 (Vic) 
Cases 
R v Gemmell [2000] NZLR 695 (CA) 
R v Goodyear [2005] EWCA Crim 888 
 
